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Abstract
The 2012 Health and Social Care Act, introduced by the coalition govern-
ment, has been seen as fundamentally changing the form and content 
of publicly funded health care provision in England. The legislation was 
hugely controversial and widely criticized. Much of this criticism pointed 
to the ways in which the reforms undermined the funding of the National 
Health Service, and challenged the founding principle of free univer-
sal provision. In this commentary we take issue with the argument that 
the Act represented a radical break with the past and instead suggest 
that it was an extension of the previous Labour government’s neo-liberal 
reforms of the public sector. In particular, the Act invoked the prin-
ciples of ‘new professionalism’ to undermine professional dominance, 
and attract private providers into statutory health care at the expense 
of public providers. In turn, this extension of new professionalism may 
encourage public distrust in the medical profession and absolve the state 
of much of its statutory health care obligation.
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Introduction
The enactment of the Health and Social Care Act in England in March 2012 
marked the end of one of the most controversial periods of reform in the 
history of the National Health Service (NHS). As such, it marks a funda-
mental transformation of the founding principles of the NHS (Pollock et 
al., 2012) or even the end of the NHS itself (Pollock and Price, 2011; Bailey, 
2012). Since its inception (in 1948) the NHS has provided statutory universal 
health care (free at the point of need) for every citizen. It has been universally 
accessible, based on need not ability to pay. Critics, such as Pollock et al. 
(2012) have argued that the reforms, through the introduction of competi-
tive markets, mixed funding models and widespread private provision will 
erode ‘entitlement to equality of provision’, thus revoking a founding NHS 
principle of universal equity of access and ultimately leading to the end of 
statutory free and universal public health care. Conversely, there is an asser-
tion, from government, that these reforms will improve levels of efficiency 
and effectiveness, thus improving the patient experience of care in the NHS, 
although the evidence for this is ambiguous at best.
The Act also raises a central question about statutory obligations. For 
example, the initial iteration of the Bill attempted to replace the statutory 
‘duty to provide’ free universal health care with a statutory ‘duty to promote’ 
such health care. So great was the controversy around the programme of 
reform that the Bill was subjected to an almost unprecedented three month 
‘halt’ in the legislative process, to enable the coalition government (in their 
words) to ‘pause, listen [to] and reflect’ opinions towards the planned legis-
lation from assorted medical stakeholders and the general public (Hawkes, 
2011). The reforms proposed a number of significant changes to two key areas, 
firstly, to the structure of the National Health Service (NHS), and secondly 
to the delivery of NHS care.
The 2010 White Paper (which effectively set the reform agenda) asserted 
that the NHS had poor comparative outcomes in relation to mortality rates 
for ‘some respiratory diseases and some cancers’, for ‘acute complications 
of diabetes and avoidable asthma admissions’, and for infection rates of 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (DoH, 2010: 8). The NHS 
was also identified as scoring ‘relatively poorly’ on patient responsiveness 
measures, and was generally criticized for a lack of ‘consistency of excellence’ 
(DoH, 2010: 8). Framed in these terms, there was a clear crisis in the NHS. 
By presenting the problem as one of purportedly poor comparative outcome 
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measures the government also determined the shape and tenor of possible 
solutions. The accompanying rhetoric was concerned with a need for bet-
ter regulation and more measurement to improve outcomes and to ensure 
that the NHS could enhance its performance on key indicators. However, 
just one month prior to the publication of the 2010 White Paper, the Com-
monwealth Fund published a comparative review of international health care 
systems (across Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand 
and the United States), which demonstrated that the NHS was the top rated 
country in terms of levels of efficiency and effectiveness of care (see Davis 
et al., 2010). Similarly, Pritchard and Hickish (2011) found that England and 
Wales showed a higher reduction in cancer mortality rates when compared 
to a range of seven other major developed countries, between 1979 and 2006 
(across Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United States). There is thus a clear disparity between the 
White Paper and the research evidence. Ironically given the evidence based 
outcomes focus of the reformed NHS, it would appear the government are 
putting their desired outcomes ahead of the evidence.
In this context the coupling of inefficiency/ineffectiveness to the need 
for efficiency savings creates a ‘perfect storm’ for which competition between 
providers across a range of new outcome measures presents the best ‘appar-
ent’ solution. In this commentary we outline how these reforms, couched 
as they are in terms of a prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy, are best regarded 
as an extension of principles of accountability based ‘new professionalism’ 
(Light, 2010). These principles bolster a shift in public sector provision 
towards ‘buyer-dominance’, with the state positioned as the most powerful 
actor in the field of provision. Crucially this does not mean that the state 
is the dominant or monopoly provider, indeed far from it. Rather it means 
that the state, rather than the professions, the patients, the providers (non- 
statutory and statutory), or the medico-industrial complex, is the dominant 
figure in determining the form and function of health care provision. Below 
we demonstrate the ways in which the Health and Social Care Act (2012) 
facilitates this dominance. We commence by considering changes to the 
overall structure of the NHS in terms of Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs), before turning to the changes in the delivery of care through the cre-
ation of Any Qualified Provider (AQP) roles (NB: the original White Paper 
and the initial Bill referred to ‘Any Willing Provider’ but this was amended 
following the report of the NHS Future Forum).
‘Clinical Commissioning Groups’ and ‘any qualified 
provider’
In terms of the first key area, the ‘headline’ alteration to the structure of the 
NHS involved a change in the role of General Practitioners (GPs), particularly 
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in relation to primary care provision. The initial White Paper and the first 
iteration of the Bill proposed creating ‘local’ GP Commissioning Consortia 
(GCCs), which would have statutory responsibility for spending the majority 
of the national NHS commissioning budget (Powell, 2011). After the ini-
tial report from the NHS Future Forum the name of GP Commissioning 
Consortia was amended to Clinical Commissioning Groups, in a move to 
appease other professional bodies unhappy at the apparent GP dominance in 
the commissioning process (Powell, 2011). Previously health care commis-
sioning had been the responsibility of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) involving 
GPs, practice nurses, community pharmacists and optometrists. It was now 
to be devolved solely to groups or consortia of GPs in what was a much nar-
rower concentration of power. This is not to say that PCTs were exemplars 
of participatory democracy across professional groupings. Rather, as Smith 
and Goodwin (2006) note, GPs in the old PCTs did not hold a monopoly 
on representation to the extent that was proposed within GCCs in the initial 
Health and Social Care Bill (2011).
In the original Bill GCCs had no obligation whatsoever to look beyond 
GPs for membership or governance. Unsurprisingly other professions and 
lay organizations objected. In part this explained the aforementioned pause 
in the legislative process and consequent formation of the NHS Future 
Forum. The Future Forum was set up with the explicit purpose of providing 
platforms for staff and patients to feedback to government on the proposed 
reforms. Its members were drawn from non-statutory charitable organiza-
tions, local authorities, primary and secondary care and universities, and it 
was chaired by a GP, Professor Steve Fields. Following the consultation, the 
NHS Future Forum reported that there was a need for secondary care pro-
fessionals, nurses and non-professional people to be involved with GCCs. 
An amendment was added to the Bill, requiring that the governance or man-
agement boards of GCCs had to contain at least one secondary care profes-
sional and a lay member. Just to be clear, this related only to the governance 
board of the GCC; the GCC itself was still a GP-only organization. It was at 
this point that the name of GP Commissioning Consortia was amended to 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). The creation of CCGs has implica-
tions for issues of governance, regulation and modes of professional working 
that we explore below.
In terms of the second key area, care delivery, the Act moved to deregu-
late care provision through the introduction of mechanisms that enabled 
‘any qualified provider’ (AQP) to tender for contracts from the CCGs. 
These AQPs can be private, public or third sector organizations. The intro-
duction of AQPs shifts NHS professionals into an explicit market context 
where they compete for contracts against any number of statutory and non-
statutory providers as part of wider moves intended to inculcate market 
competition in public sector provision (see Black, 2010). At the time of 
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writing this has resulted in private sector companies such as Serco and Vir-
gin Care successfully tendering to provide statutory community services, 
sexual health services and prison health care services across a number of 
English NHS Trusts. Of course these companies were involved in NHS 
provision before the Bill. What is new, post legislation, is that the changes 
have resulted in private companies becoming the principal providers of 
those services such that NHS employees are required to move from NHS 
contracts on to private sector company contracts (in a process known as 
the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) or TUPE). This 
process functions to move staff out of the public sector and out of the direct 
purview of the Secretary of State for Health. Whilst TUPE-ing also hap-
pened under the previous government, the Bill enables an unprecedented 
extension of this process across much larger numbers of staff (including 
practitioners and support staff).
The context of ‘new professionalism’
In seeking to understand these reforms, as noted earlier, we draw from Light’s 
(2010) work on ‘new professionalism’ in health care. This notion is charac-
terized by three key and novel practices of governance and accountability. 
Firstly, there is a shift from a training-and-licence based model of account-
ability to a competency/performance based model. Secondly, there is a shift 
from embodied trust based on reputation, competence and empathy (see 
Calnan and Rowe, 2008) towards a new form of ‘enforceable’ or informed 
trust. Such trust moves away from principles of self-regulation, and is based 
instead on externally generated standards of competency and performance 
(external in the sense that it is outside the direct influence of the professions). 
Thirdly, this competency/performance model facilitates the development of 
a new team model of care, such that ‘non-physician clinicians’ (or by exten-
sion ‘AQP’) can undertake professional work.
Below we show how the Health and Social Care Act invokes these 
new forms of accountability as part of a process of professional gover-
nance. However, these novel forms of accountability do not mark a fun-
damental departure from previous forms. Rather they rearticulate existing 
regulatory frameworks introduced under the previous Labour government 
that appealed to established external standards, such as Evidence Based 
Medicine (EBM) and clinical and patient outcome measures. Coupled with 
a concomitant shift away from professional autonomy, these processes of 
new professionalism mark a continued and systematic attempt to further 
embed principles of buyer-dominance into the field of statutory health 
care in England. We first consider new models of competency and 
performance.
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New competency and performance models
The first of Light’s (2010) new-accountability criteria is evidenced in the 
legislation through a restated focus on outcome measures (in terms of both 
clinical and patient outcomes) and through the creation of a number of regu-
latory roles to assess professional performance against these new measures. 
The Act positions clinical outcome data and international best clinical prac-
tice as key determinants of clinical performance, and thus gives primacy to a 
model of evidence based medicine (EBM). Furthermore, these standards of 
clinical evidence are combined with routinely collected patient outcome and 
patient experience data to ensure the ‘highest quality of care’ (Health and 
Social Care Act, 2012) is delivered to patients. All of these indicators have 
been crafted in such a way as to deflect any claims of political interference. 
They all purport to draw from an evidence base beyond the realm of politi-
cal influence. There is a strong appeal to scientificity, such that any difficult 
or awkward decisions might now be justified on the basis of scientific ‘evi-
dence’. These decisions come to be seen as matters of best practice rather 
than economics or ideology. However, as DeVries et al. (2008) point out, 
appeals to such standards of ‘objectivity’ are often highly politically moti-
vated. In terms of treatment decisions, responsibility over who does, and 
more importantly who does not, get treatment is now legitimized through 
an apparently objective evidence base.
In terms of professional regulation, this will be measured by three newly 
tasked bodies; the Care Quality Commission (CQC) will regulate the ‘qual-
ity’ of provision, Monitor will regulate the ‘cost’ of provision and the NHS 
Commissioning Board will monitor the ‘efficacy’ of provision. In addition, 
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) will hold all health care providers 
to account in terms of commissioned health care outcomes at a local level. 
All of these new regulatory measures have a clear remit in terms of issues 
of governance and performance and move the reformed NHS much more 
explicitly towards an outcome focused approach. For example, the Commis-
sioning Outcomes Framework (COF) will hold CCGs to account in terms of 
measurement of clinical effectiveness, patient experience and patient safety 
data; these data will be routinely collated from other sources, such as the 
existing Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) utilized by GPs. In turn, 
the NHS Commissioning Board will be managed through the NHS Out-
comes Framework, which will have three key functions; firstly, to provide 
a national overview of NHS performance (with reference to international 
benchmarks), secondly, to make the NHS Commissioning Board account-
able to the Secretary of State for Health, and thirdly, to manage performance 
and improve outcomes across the NHS. Importantly, the National Institute 
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is developing both of these frame-
works, based on current best national and international evidence. Again, the 
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locus for evidence is external, purportedly beyond the sphere of political 
influence (from either government or the professions). Salter (2004) argued 
that much of the professional regulation undertaken in the NHS under New 
Labour was unsuccessful because health professionals staffed the regulatory 
organizations, such as NICE. The new Act combines international EBM, 
and patient experience and patient outcome data, as a means of introducing 
external loci of ‘evidence’ into the governance frame, such that the poten-
tial for professional dominance of the regulatory regime is lessened. Couple 
these new loci with the prevailing economic imperatives and the implica-
tions of these reforms in terms of clinical practice and professional regulation 
become a little clearer. This brings us to the second of Light’s (2010) criteria 
– what he describes as a new form of trust to underpin professional practice.
Enforceable trust
The reforms embed new modes of governance and regulation that move fur-
ther and further away from professional self-regulation and embodied trust 
in professionals (Calnan and Rowe, 2008) towards informed or enforced 
trust (Light, 2010). We draw attention here to the role of the state in the 
apparent demise of professional trustworthiness. Ham and Alberti (2002) 
state that a number of UK health care scandals (such as Alder Hey and Bris-
tol) ‘hasten[ed] the demise of the implicit compact between the state, the 
medical profession and the public’ (cited in Elston, 2009: 25). Certainly with 
the advent of New Public Management (NPM), trust between newly regu-
lated medical practitioners and reforming governments became strained. The 
rise, under New Labour, of processes of network governance founded on 
new modes of clinical governance and performance management did little to 
improve these strained relations (Speed, 2011).
In terms of the reformed NHS, Ferlie (2010) asserts that given the pre-
vailing austerity culture, the most likely outcome is a resurgence of NPM 
principles, and these principles are central to notions of enforceable trust. 
The associated rhetoric of government distrust in professionals, and con-
sequent changes to the extent and degree of professional self-regulation are 
again of a piece with the inculcation of buyer-dominance in the public sec-
tor. In detailing these shifts from provider driven to buyer driven public 
services Light characterizes ‘trust’ in ideological terms. He portrays the pro-
vider driven context as one dominated by ‘sacred trust in doctors’ whereas 
the buyer driven context is dominated by ‘distrust of doctors’ values’ (2010: 
278). This distrust, for Light, is attributable to four distinct sources: bad or 
incompetent professionals (such as Bristol or Alder Hey), widespread varia-
tions in cost and treatment for the same condition, self-commercialization 
and corporate co-optation. Government appeals to bad professionalism, 
and ineffective and inefficient treatment paid for from the public purse 
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legitimize the need for ‘enforceable trust’, as professionals, so the rhetoric 
goes, can clearly not be trusted to regulate themselves. Much of the impetus 
for reform, in terms of performance management, is driven by the stated 
necessity of ensuring standardized modes of treatment and patient manage-
ment (with direct patient input) in order to improve efficiency and effective-
ness. They create the conditions of necessity for new enforceable models of 
trust. Embodied trust is something that government no longer has in medical 
professions (with one notable exception, GPs). This brings us to Light’s third 
point, new models of care.
New models of care
The creation of CCGs prioritizes a very specific form of team models of care, 
with the general practitioner (GP) playing a key role. The emphasis on local 
provision, brokered by and through CCGs, presents a new model of working 
whereby the CCGs take on a dominant role in any given locality. Rather than 
universal provision, there will be different levels of provision within different 
CCGs depending upon what the CCG decides to prioritize in that locality. 
One CCG may not offer the same services as a neighbouring CCG. This 
means that CCGs become the dominant operational unit within the NHS.
This reform can, in part, be read as an extension of GP restratification 
processes that were initiated by the previous government (Calnan and Gabe, 
2009). For example, the restated policy of concentrating the vast majority of 
clinical resources in primary care, with concomitant ring fencing of funds for 
CCGs (whereas previously these were more ‘democratically’ dispersed over 
the PCT, with other professional groupings represented). Under the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012), CCGs have direct control over the provision of 
local health care through the deregulation of NHS provision. In effect the 
GPs’ role is extended to include the governance of private sector providers. 
Admittedly this happened previously in terms of Independent Sector Treat-
ment Centres (ISTCs) (see Mohan, 2009), but the 2012 legislation extends 
this line of oversight into non-statutory contexts (Imison et al., 2011). The 
deregulation of NHS provision, through AQPs also creates greater possi-
bilities for non-physician clinicians to provide statutory care, for example 
extending the possibilities for nurse-led primary care that were introduced 
under the previous Labour government. This change demonstrates the con-
tinuing shift from a model of state licensure to state regulation – whereby the 
state underlines its position as buyer, rather than provider, of care. As indi-
cated in the introduction, the initial iteration of the Health and Social Care 
Bill proposed removing the statutory obligation for the Secretary of State to 
provide health care, and replacing it only with a duty to promote such care 
(Pollock and Price, 2011). The proposal was that the Secretary of State for 
Health was to ‘act with a view to securing the provision of services’, across 
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three bodies, the NHS Commissioning Board, GP Commissioning Consor-
tia and Local Authorities. This proposal did not survive – Section 1.1(3) of 
the Act details that the ‘Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to 
parliament for the provision of the health service in England’ (Health and 
Social Care Act, 2012: 17). Whilst the duty to provide remains, much of the 
regulatory obligation in regard to that provision has been divested from gov-
ernment and devolved to the three regulatory bodies and the CCGs.
Conclusion
Had the original proposal remained, it would be hard to disagree with 
Pollock and Price’s argument that it would have signalled the end of the 
NHS as we know it. Certainly it would have meant the wholesale, marketized 
deregulation of primary care, such that market competition rather than public 
provision would have been the dominant motif in the NHS. Indeed this may 
still be the case, regardless of Section 1.1(3). As Hunter and Williams (2012) 
argue, it is hard to identify where the public interest lies in such a ‘state as 
enabler’ scenario.
Processes of deregulation and the role of the market represent, for 
Hunter and Williams (2012), the dominant political conflict of the 21st 
century. In this context the Health and Social Care Act can be seen to 
mark a new articulation of this struggle, with a novel emphasis on the 
deregulation of public health care provision. Where this novelty lies, in 
terms of policy, is in the mode of deregulation, such that the deregulated 
provision still appears as a public good. The devolution of responsibility 
down to CCGs, as main arbiters of any and all qualified providers, func-
tions to maintain a façade of public provision within a competitive care 
market which will ‘drive up quality and keep down costs’, to borrow the 
neo-liberal rhetoric.
Light (2010) argues that new professionalism is couched (in large part) 
in terms of three central criteria. That these criteria are so dominant within 
the Health and Social Care Act (2012) serves as testament to the utility of 
Light’s argument. The Health and Social Care Act is clearly an ideologically 
motivated piece of government reform, intended to undermine professional 
dominance, to inculcate private providers (to the exclusion of public provid-
ers) into statutory health care, to further inculcate discourses of public dis-
trust in professional groups and to absolve the state of much of its statutory 
health care obligation. A range of new outcome measures creates external 
loci of governance, competency and performance management frameworks, 
which in turn facilitate the deregulation of statutory primary care. In this con-
text, with the buyer dominant, there is a real danger that the NHS becomes 
little more than a branded franchise operation.
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